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A fundamental assumption of support theory is that unpacking an implicit 
disjunctive hypothesis into its component hypotheses increases its perceived 
likelihood compared to ratings of the implicit disjunction (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). 
However, recent work by Sloman et al. (2004) revealed that cuing participants with 
atypical exemplars from a category led to decreases in perceived likelihood.  Three 
interpretations of this typicality effect are reviewed and three experiments are 
reported that examine these interpretations.  Experiment 1 replicated the Sloman et al. 
(2004) findings but the generation data indicate that the judgment results may be due 
to a misinterpretation of the question.  Experiment 2 adapted the retrieval-induced-
forgetting paradigm and found that unpacking the implicit disjunction is affected by 
retrieval inducement processes, and the subjective probability judgments may be 
better accounted for by an averaging model.  Experiment 3 indicates that these 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Subjective Probability Judgments and Unpacking 
A normative assumption of subjective probability judgments is that of 
description invariance: The description of an event should not affect the judged 
probability of that event.  However, there is empirical evidence that this normative 
assumption is often violated (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994).  For 
instance, Rottenstreich & Tversky (1997) found that participants judged the 
probability that a randomly selected death was due to “homicide by an acquaintance 
or stranger” to be greater than “homicide” alone.  When the implicit disjunction 
(homicide) is unpacked into an explicit disjunction by making exemplars of homicide 
explicit (homicide by an acquaintance or stranger), the judged probability of the 
event increased.  The findings of Rottenstriech & Tversky (1997) are representative 
of a number of studies on judgments of disjunctive events (Brody, Coulter, & 
Daneshfar, 2003; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983; Tversky & Koehler, 1994).   
Recent research has explored the cognitive underpinnings of unpacking, and 
has begun to identify the boundary conditions of the general finding that unpacking 
an implicit disjunction hypothesis leads to an increased judged probability.  These 
boundary conditions challenge the traditional interpretation of the unpacking effect.  




disjunction’s judged probability to be less than the corresponding implicit disjunction 
(Sloman et al., 2004).  When the implicit disjunction was explicitly unpacked with 
exemplars that were atypical of the event, the judged probability of the event 
decreased as compared to the corresponding implicit disjunction being unpacked with 
exemplars that were typical of the event and the implicit disjunction itself.  For 
instance, participants judged the packed event that a randomly selected person in the 
United States would die from a disease to be equivalent to the typically unpacked 
event that a randomly selected person in the United States would die from “heart 
disease, cancer, stroke, or any other disease.”  Yet, the atypically unpacked event that 
a randomly selected person in the United States would die from “pneumonia, 
cirrhosis, diabetes, or any other disease,” was judged to be significantly less probable 
than both the packed and the typically unpacked events.  This empirical result from 
Sloman et al. (2004) is in clear opposition to the standard disjunction results. 
The aim of the current paper is to test various theories that account for the 
effect of typicality on unpacking.  I first provide a brief review of the dominant theory 
of subjective probability judgments, support theory, and discuss the failure of this 
model to account for typicality effects.  I then review three alternative interpretations 
of the typicality effect on judgment: a modified version of support theory, a narrow 
interpretation of instances theory, and a misinterpretation hypothesis. Finally I present 
three experiments aimed at disentangling these various accounts.  
Support Theory 
Support theory proposes that subjective probabilities are based on descriptions 




1994).  Formally, support theory asserts that people make probability judgments by 
comparing the support for a focal hypothesis (A) with the support for an alternative 
hypothesis (B): 
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Events A and B each can be thought of as consisting of N elementary hypotheses 
(disjunctions) such that {a1, a2…aN} ∈ A and {b1, b2 … bN} ∈ B, where N ≥1, and 
P(A, B) represents the probability of the focal hypothesis A occurring rather than the 
alternate hypothesis B occurring.  Subjective probability is a function of the 
proportion of support that favors the focal hypothesis (A) rather than the alternative 
hypothesis (B).   For example, suppose one is asked to estimate the likelihood that a 
person in the United States will die from a disease in the next year.  According to 
support theory this judgment is made by comparing support for the focal hypothesis 
(e.g., death by disease) with the support for the alternate hypothesis (i.e., death by 
anything other than disease).1
                                                 
1 Support theory does not discuss retrieval processes used when retrieving items from the judgment set; 





A key distinction within support theory is the notion of packed (implicit 
disjunctions) versus unpacked (explicit disjunctions) hypotheses.  A packed 
hypothesis is one in which the elements of the hypothesis are not explicitly stated.  
Conversely, an unpacked hypothesis is one in which some or all of the elements of 
the hypothesis set are explicitly stated.  Tversky & Koehler (1994) argued that 
unpacking a packed hypothesis (e.g., death by disease) into its component hypotheses 
(e.g., death by cancer, heart disease, and other diseases) increases the perceived 
support of that hypothesis.  Importantly, support theory anticipated that unpacking the 
numerator (A) in Equation 1 should lead to increases in judged probability, whereas 
unpacking the denominator (B) should lead to decreases in the judged probability.  
The perceived support for the unpacked focal hypothesis is expected to be equal to or 
greater than the packed hypothesis, and subsequently the judged probability of the 
unpacked hypothesis should be equal to or greater than the packed disjunction, which 
is what has been found empirically (Brody, Coulter, & Daneshfar, 2003; Mann, 1997; 
Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). 
Support theory explains violations of descriptive invariance, but it does not 
anticipate the typicality effects found by Sloman et al. (2004) without modification.  
At present support theory assumes an additive support function that is most clearly 
demonstrated by the denominator of Equation 1.  Given this additive function, 
unpacking the numerator should lead to monotonic increases in judged probability, 
regardless of the support of the unpacked elements.  However, in other domains, there 
is evidence that judgments often follow an averaging function rather than an additive 




1970; Shanteu, 1972).  Thus, there is some basis for the hypothesis that perceived 
support is based on the average support of the unpacked hypotheses rather than an 
additive function. 
Central Tendency Model 
A straightforward modification of support theory would be to assume that the 
support values are a function of the central tendency of support rather than 
summation of support.  The most commonly used measure of central tendency, the 
mean, will be the focus of this research as an average support function would predict 
the typicality results.  An averaging model would have the support values being 


















)(                                                             (5)      
where n is the number of unpacked hypotheses.  
Assuming support is a function of the average, instead of the sum, enables 
support theory to account for the effect of typicality on judgment.  If all generated 
items are of equivalent support, then mean support would be independent of the 
number generated.  However, we assume that people generate items of varying 
support, and the more items that are generated the more likely it is that people will 
generate low-support items. The averaging model then leads to the counter-intuitive 




generated since the mean support should decrease as the number of items generated 
increases.  This would then predict that the number of hypotheses generated should be 
negatively correlated with mean support.  In contrast, the sum of the support for the 
hypotheses generated should be positively correlated with the number of hypotheses 
generated.  Moreover, if judgments are based on an averaging model, we would 
expect that judgments of probability should be positively correlated with mean 
support of items generated, but if they are based on an additive model then judgments 
should be positively correlated with the sum of support of items generated.  
Narrow Interpretation Theory 
Another interpretation of the typicality results that builds upon support theory 
is offered by Sloman et al. (2004), who propose a modified theory of subjective 
probability referred to as the narrow interpretation theory.  The narrow interpretation 
theory claims that “people interpret category descriptions narrowly, in terms of 
typical instances” (Sloman et al., 2004).  This is similar to support theory, which 
claims that the category instances that are included in the judgment set and comprise 
the instances of perceived support are primarily based on the most representative 
category instances (Tversky & Koehler, 1994).  Sloman et al. (2004) further posit that 
the most representative instances tend to be the most typical instances.  Typical 
category instances may be the most representative of the category due to a common 
occurrence of these instances and a high similarity between these and other category 
instances (Hampton, 1998).  The similarity with other category instances should aid 




should serve to increase the assessment of support.  Thus typicality is theorized to 
positively correlate with support, though exceptions do exist (Sloman et al. 2004).   
The narrow interpretation theory and support theory appear to be in agreement 
that the category instances that are retrieved are the basis of support judgments, and 
that these retrieved instances are usually the most representative instances of the 
category being judged.  Sloman et al. (2004) elaborate by claiming that the most 
representative instances are the typical instances, that typicality and support are 
correlated, and then they move beyond support theory by claiming that unpacking is 
not a sufficient condition to increase subjective probability judgments.   
The narrow interpretation theory and support theory also agree that instances, 
or cues, serve to capture the judge’s attention, but the narrow interpretation theory 
claims that this focus will cause the judgment to be closer to a judgment of the 
support of the unpacked cues rather than the entire category.  The operating 
mechanism for this focusing effect on judgment is not made explicit within the 
narrow interpretation theory.  However, part-set cuing effects, inhibition effects, and 
anchoring and adjustment are hypothesized as being the most likely mechanisms 
underlying the focusing effect assumption that leads probability judgments to be 
proportional to the support of the explicitly unpacked instances.   
As a potential explanation of the narrow interpretation theory, the part-set 
cuing effect may be the most likely given the methodology of Sloman et al. (2004).  
Part-set cuing is the non-intuitive finding that providing participants with a few 
exemplars of a set of to-be-retrieved items can actually decrease retrieval (Slamecka, 




attempt to recall the items in the set, with some participants receiving several example 
items from the studied set at the time of recall.  Participants who receive example 
item cues at recall often showed poorer recall for the rest of the (non-presented) items 
in the set.   
This part-set cuing effect can be found in episodic as well as semantic 
memory, in recall as well as recognition, and with intralist and extralist cues (Brown, 
1968; Todres & Watkins, 1981; Watkins, 1975).  There are several theories of part-
list cuing, including retrieval competition, inhibition, and strategy disruption 
(Anderson, M., Bjork, R.A., & Bjork, E.L., 1994; Rundus, 1973; Basden & Basden, 
1995).  Although there is no clear evidence for one theory over another, part-set cuing 
is a relatively robust and well documented effect (Brown, 1968; Foos & Clark, 2000; 
Slamecka, 1968; Todres & Watkins, 1981; Watkins, 1975).  Since Sloman et al. 
(2004) employ a methodology very similar to the part-set cuing paradigm, it is likely 
that the observed effects of typicality on judgment are the result of part-set cuing. 
If there is an effect of part-set cuing or inhibition, the prediction would be that 
the category cues lead to an impairment of the judge to retrieve and consider other 
instances in the category.  The cues provided are therefore more integral to the 
support function and determining the magnitude of the judgment, with subsequent 
probability judgments being proportional to the cues provided.  In this manner, the 
narrow interpretation theory prediction that judgments are proportional to the support 
of the unpacked instances may occur through a part-set cuing or inhibition process. 
Rather than a part-set cuing or inhibition effect, it may be that probability 




interpretation theory.  The explicitly unpacked instances may serve as an anchor from 
which judges adjust insufficiently for other category instances.  When the implicit 
disjunction is presented or when typical instances are presented, a judge would have a 
high anchor point and would then insufficiently adjust the judgment down.  
Conversely, when atypical instances are made explicit there will be a low initial 
anchor point and then insufficient upward adjustment. 
Misinterpretation Theory 
A less glamorous, albeit plausible, explanation of the typicality effects 
observed by Sloman et al. (2004) is that participants misinterpreted the probability 
question as asking them to judge the probability of events similar to the exemplars.  
The judges may then interpret the question differently depending on the category 
instances that are explicitly unpacked.  For instance, if atypical category events are 
provided in the judgment question then judges might interpret that question to be 
asking them to judge the likelihood that an atypical event, such as the events listed, 
will occur.  Likewise, if a typical category event is provided then the judge may 
assume that they are to judge the likelihood that a typical event, such as the listed 
events, will occur.  Since the most typical category instances are assumed to be the 
instances more likely to be retrieved and considered when no category instances are 
provided, the implicit disjunction and the explicit disjunction with typical instances 
may be interpreted and judged in a similar manner: judging the likelihood of a typical 
event.  Under the misinterpretation hypothesis, there is no reason to expect that 




hypotheses generated.  Moreover, cue typicality should have no effect on the number 
of hypotheses generated, summed support, or mean support. 
The above explanations are all plausible interpretations of the effect of 
typicality on judgment.  However, the experiments completed by Sloman et al. (2004) 
do not allow one to distinguish amongst these various accounts.  Sloman et al. (2004) 
employ a methodology that is very similar to the traditional part-set cuing paradigm, 
but they did not examine whether these cues had concomitant effects on retrieval.  
Such retrieval data is important for discriminating amongst the various interpretations 
outlined above.  For example, a part-set cuing or inhibition account of the effect of 
typicality would anticipate that participants who are cued with typical or atypical 
exemplars would retrieve fewer hypotheses than participants in a no-cue condition.  
Additionally, a follow-up question that could be addressed by retrieval data is 
whether participants base their assessment of support on an additive model or an 
averaging model: An additive model would predict higher judgments with increased 
number of hypotheses while an averaging model would predict lower judgments with 
increased number of hypotheses retrieved. 
Hypotheses and Predictions 
Including a generation task in Sloman et al.’s (2004) modified part-set cuing 
paradigm should enable an assessment of what items are being included in the 
judgment set that is the basis of the subjective judgments, and subsequently which 
interpretation best captures the judgment data.  In Experiment 1, participants are 
given a judgment task identical to that used in Sloman et al. (2004), following their 




generation phase occurs immediately after the judgment phase it is plausible that the 
items generated are the items that were used in making their probability judgment. 
Generation data enables an initial assessment of whether part-set cuing or 
inhibition effects are present by comparing how many items are generated when 
category cues are present versus not present.  Part-set cuing and inhibition effects 
would manifest as fewer items being generated when a cue is provided as compared 
to a non-cued condition, regardless of the cue typicality.  If cued and non-cued 
conditions have an equivalent number of items generated, or if one cue condition 
generates more items than the other cue condition, this would be evidence against the 
part-set cuing and inhibition. 
Generation data, along with an independent measure of support values for the 
generation data, also enables an assessment of what type of support function best fits 
the data.  This assessment of support function may occur through observing which 
function trends in the same manner as the judgment data.  If an averaging function is 
being used then the average support of items generated when atypical cues are 
presented should be less than the average support of items generated when typical or 
no cues are presented.  The average support of items generated when no cues or when 
typical cues are provided should be equivalent.  Similarly, if an additive function is 
being used then the summation of items generated should follow the same trends as 
the judgment data.   
It could be the case that both the average support and the summation of 
support of items generated have similar trends, in which case neither function could 




of items generated may not trend in the same manner and only one function may 
trend in the same manner as the judgment data.  This would lead to a convincing case 
for either function if the summation and the average support of items generated 
diverged with only one function mapping onto the judgment data. 
Another alternative is that the generation data does not correspond to the 
judgment data.  If this is the case then it might be an indication that the generation 
data are not representative of what is being retrieved and judged, and that the 













Sloman et al.’s (2004) results appear to support their narrow interpretation 
theory through a part-set cuing effect or inhibition, or an anchoring and adjustment 
process, but it could also indicate that people are using an averaging function to 
assess support for the focal hypothesis, or that they simply misinterpreted the 
probability question.  Experiment 1 aimed to replicate the judgments results of 
Sloman et al. (2004) and extend their methodology by asking participants to explicitly 
unpack the focal hypothesis after making their subjective judgment.  This generation 
task was implemented in order to assess if there is an effect of part set cuing or 
inhibition that may underlie the narrow interpretation theory, and to assess if an 
additive or averaging model best fits the judgment data. 
Support values for the category items that were generated were obtained by an 
independent sample of participants who had not made any judgments on the category 
or generated any items from the category.  These support values were then used to 
assess whether the obtained judgment data could be a function of the generation data 
through either an additive or averaging function. 
Participants 
Ninety-one University of Maryland undergraduate students participated and 





The experiment was completely computerized and was programmed in Media 
Lab.  The judgment question was taken verbatim from Sloman et al. (2004) and the 
generation question was revised from the judgment question to ask for generation 
rather than a judgment. 
Design and Procedure 
The methodology for Experiment 1 was taken from Sloman et al. (2004), 
whereby each participant was asked to make one judgment.  The only modification to 
the methods was the addition of a generation task after the judgment that asked 
participants to explicitly unpack the focal hypothesis for the previous judgment. 
The study is a between subjects design with three conditions: packed, atypical 
unpacked exemplars (atypical condition), and typical unpacked exemplars (typical 
condition).  Participants were asked to provide a judgment to the following question, 
taken from Sloman et al. (2004): 
Consider all the people that will die in the U.S. next year.  Suppose that we 
pick one of these people at random.  Please estimate the probability that this 
person’s death will be attributed to the following causes. 
 
Participants in the packed condition were asked to judge the probability of the 
hypothesis “disease” (n = 30).  Participants in the typical condition (n = 30) were 
asked to judge the probability of the same hypothesis, but were provided with three 
exemplars of the most common disease that people die from, along with the residual 
hypothesis: “heart disease, cancer, stroke, or any other disease.”  Likewise, 




are fairly uncommon causes of diseases that people may die from, along with the 
residual hypothesis: “pneumonia, diabetes, cirrhosis, or any other disease.”  
 Immediately following the judgment, participants were asked to unpack the 
focal hypothesis (i.e., diseases that a person in the United States may have died from 
last year).  The judgment question was modified to ask for the participant to generate 
category instances rather than a judgment:   
Consider all of the people that will die from a disease in the U.S. next year.  
Suppose that we select one of these people at random.  Please list the possible 
diseases this person could have died from.   
 
The participants were limited to providing a maximum of twenty items for the 
generation task.  The two tasks took approximately five minutes to complete. 
Support Functions 
An independent sample of thirty-five University of Maryland undergraduate 
students who had not taken part in Experiment 1, rated the support of items generated 
in Experiment 1.  Participants received extra credit for a psychology course. 
The items generated (n=141) from Experiment 1 were compiled into one list 
and were used to obtain independent support values.  Each participant rated each of 
the 141 items that were generated on a 1-7 typicality scale with 1 being not at all 
typical and 7 being extremely typical.  The participants were instructed: 
In this study you are going to be asked to rate possible diseases that may cause 
death... When rating the disease, please rate it in terms of how typical it is of a 
disease that people in the US died from last year.  You will be asked to rate 
the disease on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being “Not at all Typical” and 7 being 





The ratings provided were then averaged across participants to create an average 
typicality score for each item that was generated.  These average typicality scores 
were used as support values for each item. 
Results and Discussion 
Generation Data 
There was no main effect of cue typicality on the number of items generated 
(see Figure 1): The three conditions did not significantly differ in the number of 
category items generated after providing a judgment.2  This indicates that the 
category cues provided in the judgment question did not serve to decrease the number 
of items that were generated. Thus, based on the generation data, there is no evidence 
that providing participants with typical or atypical category cues led to part-set cuing 
or inhibition effects.  
Support Values 
There was also no main effect of cue typicality on the summation of support 
of the items generated (see Figure 2).3  There were no significant differences between 
the atypically cued, typically cued, and packed conditions summation of support of 
the items generated.   
                                                 
2 The generation data was compiled into three separate generation lists: One generation list consisted of 
the instances exactly as they were generated by participants, a second list had all the cues removed 
from the generation data, and a third list had all the cues included in the generation of instances, 
regardless of whether or not the participant had explicitly listed the cues in their generation data.  All 
analyses yielded similar results and so only the cue inclusion list will be reported for Experiment 1. 
 
3 Each category instance that a person generated had a support value obtained from an independent 
sample of raters, and these values were summed for each participant so that each participant had a 






























   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
. 
























   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  .
Figure 2. Experiment 1 Summation of Support of Items Generated by Part-Set Cue Typicality with 





Additionally, an average strength of support score for items generated was 
obtained for each participant by averaging the support values for each item generated 
by each participant.  There was a main effect of cue typicality on average strength of 
support of items, F(2, 88) = 3.13, p<0.05 (see Figure 3).  However, there were no 
significant post-hoc differences between any of the cue conditions.  At most, this 
result would indicate that an averaging model may predict an overall effect but no 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 Average Support of Items Generated by Part-Set Cue Typicality with Standard 
Error Bars  
 
Taken together the summation and mean support of items generated do not 
give a clear picture of which, if either, of these two functions may underlie the 
participant’s probability judgments.  Since the manipulation of cue typicality had no 




additive and the averaging models would predict no effect of cue typicality on 
judgments. 
Judgments 
  The judgment results replicated Sloman et al. (2004) and found a main effect 
of cue typicality on probability judgment F(2, 88) = 4.26, p < 0.05 (see Figure 4): The 
typical and packed conditions mean judgments were not significantly different, while 
the atypical conditions mean judgment was significantly less than both the packed 
and typical conditions judgments (see Table 1).  Cue typicality had an effect on 
subjective probability judgments such that when atypical instances are explicitly 
provided the probability judgments are significantly less than when typical instances 





















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
.








Packed Atypical Typical 
Judgment Mean 
(Std. Deviation) 
0.52  (0.22) 0.38  (0.26) 0.54  (0.25) 
Number of Items 
Generated (SD) 
6.10  (2.19) 6.94  (3.95) 7.03  (4.11) 
Summation of 
Support of Items 
(SD) 
24.60 (7.56) 26.11 (11.94) 35.93 (12.03) 
Mean Support of 
Items (SD) 
4.18  (0.63) 3.63  (1.05) 3.64  (1.16) 
 
Table 1. Experiment 1 Means (and Standard Deviations) 
 
There were no significant correlations between judgment and the number of 
items, summation, or average support of items generated (see Table 2).  However, the 
correlations were based on 30 participants and thus may have low power for detecting 
potentially small but significant correlations between judgments and any of the 
generation data. 
There was a significant positive correlation between the number of items 
generated and the summation of support of items generated for all typicality 
conditions (see Table 2).  Consistent with our assumption that increased unpacking 
leads to an increased likelihood of unpacking atypical items, there was a significant 
negative correlation between the number of items generated and the average support 
of items generated for all typicality condition (see Table 2).   
The correlation results indicate that as more items are generated the 
summation of support increases while the average support decreases.  Additionally, 
the correlations between the summation and the average support of items generated 
were negative in all typicality conditions, but were only significant in the typical 




more atypical items being included in the generation data, which is again consistent 
with our previous assumption of increased unpacking leading to more atypical items 
being retrieved.  These results also indicate that the summation and average support 
of items generated may be diverging: Increasing the summation of support occurs 
while the average support of items generated decreases. 
  
No Category Cue Condition 






Judgment 1 -.06 -.10 .02 
Number of Items  -.06 1 .91** -.66** 
Summation of Support -.10 .91** 1 -.34 
Average Support  .02 -.66** -.34 1 
  
Atypical Category Cue Condition 
Judgment 1 .00 .09 .12 
Number of Items  .00 1 .97** -.44* 
Summation of Support .09 .97** 1 -.22 
Average Support  .12 -.44* -.22 1 
  
Typical Category Cue Condition 
Judgment 1 .03 -.08 -.02 
Number of Items  .03 1 .92** -.86** 
Summation of Support -.08 .92** 1 -.65** 
Average Support  -.02 -.86** -.65** 1 
*p < .05.  **p < .01 
 
Table 2. Experiment 1 Correlations by Typicality: Judgment, Number of items Generated, Summation 





 To further test whether the effect of cue typicality on judgment was due to the 
generation of hypotheses, a series of covariate analyses were conducted.  The 
covariate analyses were performed to test whether the effect of cue typicality 
remained significant after controlling for variance due to the number, the summation 
of the support, and the mean support of the items generated.  None of these factors 
were significant covariates and in all cases the effect of cue typicality remained 
significant.  This indicates that the number, the summation of support, and the mean 
support of items generated are not predictive of judgments.  Taken together these 
results are inconsistent with an additive and averaging support theory, but the results 
still are consistent with the anchoring and adjustment and misinterpretation 
hypotheses. 
In sum, the results from Experiment 1 replicated Sloman et al.’s (2004) 
judgment results with atypically cued judgments being significantly lower than the 
typically cued and non-cued packed conditions.  However, the generation data from 
Experiment 1 do not show any effects of cue typicality on the quantity of items 
generated after making the category judgment.  Since the atypical and typically cued 
conditions do not show a decrease in the number of items generated as compared to 
the non-cued condition, this suggests that there is no part-set cuing or inhibition 
affecting the judgment or generation processes.  It would appear that neither part-set 
cuing nor inhibition are the underlying mechanisms of the narrow interpretation 
theory.  Furthermore, the summation and average support of items generated do not 
differ by cue typicality, which indicates that neither an additive nor an averaging 




may be indicative that a misinterpretation of the question or an anchoring and 




Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
 
Introduction 
Experiment 2 sought to incorporate another memory paradigm into the 
judgment literature to enhance our understanding of the interplay between memory 
and judgment, while simultaneously minimizing potential misinterpretations of the 
question or anchoring and adjustment processes.  In the modified part-set cuing 
paradigm used in Experiment 1 and by Sloman et al. (2004), the category cues and 
the judgment question are intertwined.  This may increase the possibility of a 
misinterpretation of the question since the cues are present in the judgment question.  
Experiment 2 uses a modified retrieval-induced-forgetting paradigm that allows the 
category cues to precede the question so that all typicality conditions can receive the 
same judgment question.     
Retrieval induced forgetting is similar in effect and paradigm to part-set 
cuing: The process of retrieving some items appears to cause forgetting of other 
items.  The retrieved item will be facilitated and more likely to be recalled again later, 
but other items that are associated with the same retrieval cue as the retrieved item are 
more likely to be forgotten (Anderson, 2006; Anderson, 2005; Anderson, Bjork, & 
Bjork, 200; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995).  Much 
like part-set cuing there are various theories for the retrieval induced forgetting effect.  
Two of the dominant theories are the competitor strengthening theory whereby the 




the other items related to that cue (Blaxton & Neely, 1993; Brown, 1981), or the 
inhibition theory whereby a suppression of all non-recalled related words occurs 
during selective retrieval (Anderson 2006; Anderson, 2005; Anderson 2003; 
Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson, 2004; Levy & Anderson, 2002).  Though 
the exact causal mechanism is under debate, the effect is well documented and the 
paradigm may be well suited to assess judgment as well as memory (Anderson, 2001; 
Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 2000; Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson, 2004; 
Anderson, Green, & McCulloch, 2000; Anderson & McCulloch, 1999; Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995). 
In the typical retrieval-induced-forgetting paradigm, participants are presented 
with several items from a category and instructed to memorize these items.  They 
subsequently are presented with the category and word-stem cues for half of the 
category items as retrieval cues.  This retrieval practice leads to improved recall for 
the cued items and impairs recall of the non-recalled items in a cued-recall test as 
compared with a category condition where there is no retrieval practice (Anderson, 
Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995).  
This memory paradigm can be modified in the same manner as the part-set 
cuing paradigm was modified to become a judgment paradigm: Assume a pre-
experimental semantic set exists so that there is no experimental learning phase, and 
proceed immediately to “cue” the participants with items from the set by having them 
perform selective retrieval.  Baüml (2002) demonstrated that retrieval inducement can 
occur even for pre-experimental knowledge, or knowledge of items not explicitly 




If items from the pre-experimental category set are selectively retrieved then 
the cues would precede the judgment question, allowing the judgment question to be 
the same implicit disjunction for all judges.  With all judges receiving the same 
judgment question the likelihood of a misinterpretation of the question is decreased as 
well as anchoring and adjustment process since there are no cues in the judgment 
question.   
As in Experiment 1, a generation task followed the judgment question. This 
allowed us to test if there were part-set cuing or inhibition effects on memory, and 
whether an additive or averaging model best explained the judgment data. 
Participants 
Forty-nine University of Maryland undergraduate students participated in the 
study.  Participants received extra credit for a psychology course.  Two participants 
did not correctly retrieve any of the category cues and their data were subsequently 
not used in any judgment or generation analyses. 
Materials 
 The experiment was completely computerized and was programmed in 
Revolution.  There were two inducement cues for each condition: atypical 
inducement condition (i.e., diabetes and tuberculosis) and typical inducement 
condition (i.e., heart disease and cancer).  These cues were taken from the atypical 
and typical instances in the cued judgment question from Sloman et al. (2004), with 
the exception of one of the atypical cues.  One atypical cue was replaced from the 




retrieve.  The cue used (tuberculosis) was more likely to be retrieved and still seemed 
to be an atypical item representing a disease that causes death in the United States.  
The judgment question was taken verbatim from Sloman et al.’s (2004) packed 
judgment question.  The generation question was revised from the judgment question 
to ask for generation rather than a judgment, and was the same generation question 
from Experiment 1. 
Design and Procedure 
The study was a between subjects design with two conditions: atypical cue 
inducement (atypical condition), and typical cue inducement (typical condition).  Two 
cues were used in both the atypical (diabetes and tuberculosis) and the typical (heart 
disease and cancer) condition.  There were three phases to the experiment: a retrieval 
inducement, a judgment and a generation phase.   
Since there was no learning phase the inducement phase relied on an assumed 
pre-experimental semantic set of diseases.  In the inducement phase the category 
name (disease) was presented along with the first two letters of the cue that was to be 
retrieved and participants were instructed to fill in the blank with an appropriate 
word.  For example, in the typical condition a participant might see “Disease – 
Ca________” and would be asked to fill in the blank (i.e., cancer). 
For the judgment phase participants were asked the packed probability 
judgment question from Sloman et al. (2004) and Experiment 1.  Immediately 
following the judgment, participants were asked to unpack the focal hypothesis.  The 




no maximum number of items that the participants could generate and the three 
phases took approximately five minutes to complete. 
Support Functions 
Support values were obtained for all of the generation data from the same 
sample, procedures, and items used in Experiment 1.  The raters had not participated 
in either Experiment 1 or Experiment 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Generation Data 
A main effect of cue typicality on the number of items generated was obtained 
F(1, 45) = 14.07, p < 0.001 (see Figure 5).4  The atypically cued condition generated 
significantly more items than the typically cued condition (see Table 3).  The atypical 
inducement lead participants to generate more items from the category.  This result 
appears inconsistent with a part-set cuing effect: There were no cues present in the 
judgment question and so there would be no expectation that the generation data for 
the two conditions would differ in the number of items generated. 
Support Values 
There was a main effect of cue typicality on the summation of the support of 
the items generated F(1, 45) = 5.71, p<0.05 (see Figure 6).  The participants who 
retrieved atypical category instances had a significantly higher summation of support 
than the participants who retrieved typical category instances (see Table 3). 
                                                 
4 The exact generation list was used in all analyses since the cues were not present in either the 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 Mean Number of Items Generated by Retrieval Inducement Cue Typicality 
with Standard Error Bars 
 
 
 Atypical Typical 
Judgment Mean (Std. Deviation) 0.41  (0.29) 0.56  (0.22)   
Number of Items Generated (SD) 7.90  (3.10) 4.85  (2.43) 
Summation of Support of Items (SD) 27.82  (10.81) 20.84  (9.2) 
Mean Support of Items (SD) 3.58  (0.65) 4.30  (1.07) 
Table 3. Experiment 2 Means (and Standard Deviations) 
 
 There was also a main effect of cue typicality on the average support of the 
items generated F(1, 45) = 7.18, p <0.05 (see Figure 7).  The atypical-cue condition 
had a lower average support of items generated than the typical-cue condition (see 
Table 2).  Thus there are main effects for both the summation of support and mean 
support of items generated by cue typicality.  The atypical-cue condition generated 




significantly higher summation of support of items generated: The more items that are 
generated the greater the summed support of all the items.  However, the atypical-cue 
condition has a significantly lower mean support of items generated than the typical-
cue condition.  This indicates that the atypical cue did not simply lead to more items 
being generated, but lead specifically to more items with lower support values being 
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 Summation Support of Items Generated by Retrieval Inducement Typicality 
with Standard Error Bars  
 
In sum, the atypical-cue condition has a higher summation but a lower 
average support of items generated than the typical-cue condition.  These generation 
results provide differential predictions for the judgment data for the additive and 
averaging functions.  If an additive function is being used to make judgments then the 




the atypically cued condition has a higher summation of support.  Conversely, if an 
averaging function is being used then the atypical-cue condition should have a lower 
judgment than the typical condition since the atypically cued condition has a lower 
average support.  The generation data thus provide two opposing predictions for the 
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Figure 7. Experiment 2 Average Support of Items Generated by Retrieval Inducement Typicality with 
Standard Error Bars  
 
Judgments 
There is a main effect of cue typicality on judgments F(1, 45) = 4.27, p < 0.05 
(see Figure 8), with judgments following atypical retrieval inducement being 
significantly lower than judgments following typical retrieval inducement (see Table 
3).  Even though both conditions received the exact same judgment question, they 




the category to be judged, this appears to decrease their subsequent probability 
judgment as compared to participants who retrieve typical category instances.  This 
provides some support against a misinterpretation hypothesis or an anchoring and 
adjustment process since all participants judged the same question and still had 
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 Mean Probability Judgments by Retrieval Inducement Cue Typicality with 
Standard Error Bars 
 
The atypical inducement led to a decrease in probability judgments compared 
to typical inducement, which is what the averaging model would predict from the 
generation data.  Since the atypical-cue condition had a significantly lower average 
support of items generated the averaging model predicts the observed judgment data: 
a lower probability judgment for the atypical condition relative to the typical 




condition had a significantly higher summation of support of items generated, the 
additive model would predict that the atypical condition should have a higher 
probability judgment than the typical condition, which is not what occurred.  Taken 
together the generation and judgment data appear to support an averaging rather than 
additive function underlying judgments. 
However, there were no significant correlations between judgment and the 
number of items, summation, or average support of items generated (see Table 4).  
These correlations were based on 21-26 participants for each correlation and thus may 
have low power for detecting potentially small but significant correlations between 
judgments and any of the generation data.   
  
Atypical Cue Inducement 






Judgment 1 -.38 -.39 -.11 
Number of Items  -.38 1 .97** .01 
Summation of Support -.39 .97** 1 .16 
Average Support  -.11 .01 .16 1 
  
Typical Cue Inducement 
Judgment 1 -.23 -.10 .28 
Number of Items  -.23 1 .93** -.25 
Summation of Support -.10 .93** 1 .11 
Average Support  .28 -.25 .11 1 
*p < .05.  **p < .01 
 
Table 4. Experiment 2 Correlations by Typicality: Judgment, Number of items Generated, Summation 





Consistent with Experiment 1 there was a significant positive correlation 
between the number of items generated and the summation of support of items 
generated for both typicality conditions (see Table 4).  However, there was not a 
significant correlation between the number of items generated and the average 
support of items generated for either typicality condition as there was in Experiment 
1. 
Retrieval of different cue typicality had an effect on subjective probability 
judgments such that when atypical instances are retrieved the probability judgments 
are significantly less than when typical instances are retrieved.  In order to test 
whether the effect of cue typicality on judgment was due to the generation of 
hypotheses, a series of covariate analyses were conducted: Three separate analyses 
were performed to test whether the effect of cue typicality remained significant after 
controlling for variance due to the number of items generated, the summation of the 
support values of the generated items, and the mean support of the generated items.  
Only the number of items generated was a significant covariate of judgments 
F(1, 43) =  4.30, p<0.05, and when the number of items generated was controlled for 
as a covariate the effect of cue typicality was no longer significant.  As suggested by 
the correlations presented in Table 4, the number of items generated was negatively 
related to judgment. This finding is clearly inconsistent with the additive model, 
which predicts that increases in the number of alternatives generated should lead to 
increases in judged probability.  However, the results are consistent with the 









Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
 
Introduction 
The judgment results from Experiment 1 were replicated in Experiment 2: 
Cue typicality affected judgment magnitude with atypical cues leading to lower 
judgment than typical cues.  Experiment 2 also demonstrated that cue typicality 
affected the number of items generated, the summation of support of items generated 
and the average support of items generated.  However, one limitation of the previous 
Experiments is that the support functions are post-hoc subjective ratings and the terms 
‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ have been used extensively, but have not been well defined or 
operationalized.  For this reason, in Experiment 3 we operationalized ‘typicality’ in 
terms of experienced frequency.  Experience with items may lead to a classification 
of typicality such that the more often an item is viewed the more typical it may appear 
to be of its representative category.  It is plausible, therefore, that typicality may 
reflect frequency of occurrence and it is this conceptualization of typicality that will 
be examined. 
Frequency learning tasks are often used in memory paradigms to examine 
judgment accuracy (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003; Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006; 
Windschitl et al., 2002).  For example, Dougherty & Hunter (2003) had participants 
learn what items were ordered by particular individuals at a diner by presenting 
individual food items on the screen each time the individuals ordered the item.  The 




the frequency with which the items appeared (i.e., how often the items were ordered).  
This frequency learning is useful in that the set of items is experimentally determined 
and is thus a well defined and exhaustive set, and the frequency of each item is also 
experimentally controlled. 
Since typicality and frequency are theorized to be closely linked, one may 
reasonably determine to operationalize, and test the definition of typicality as high 
presentation frequency (Sloman et al., 2004).  With this definition, items with the 
highest presentation frequency would be considered the most typical items while 
items with the lowest presentation frequency would be considered the least typical 
items.  Typicality can now be tested as frequency presentation and may be well 
defined and manipulated experimentally to more directly assess the potential affects 
of typicality on category judgments and generation. 
Experiment 3 further assessed a potential limitation of the previous typicality 
findings: Does typicality affect judgments and generation in a small, well defined set?  
The previous experiments relied upon very large and fairly ill-defined categories in 
order to assess the effects of typicality on subjective probability judgments.  It may be 
that a large and fuzzy category is needed in order for typicality of items presented to 
affect judgments.  Once the judgment set is small and well defined the effects of 
typicality may be minimized or eliminated since the judge can more easily retrieve 
and consider all the items in the judgment set. 
Additionally the current research more directly assess the differences between 
the modified part-set cuing and modified retrieval induced forgetting to see if there 





 One hundred sixty two University of Maryland undergraduate students 
participated in Experiment 3.  Participants received extra credit for a psychology 
course.   
Materials 
 The experiment was completely computerized and was programmed in 
Revolution.  There were two lists of stimuli: a list of ten fruits and a list of ten 
animals that was taken from the VanOverschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) 
category norms from the fruit and animal category lists.  The top two most common 
and the bottom two least common fruits and animals were excluded from the lists and 
within each list no item started with the same letter as any other item in that list (i.e., 
apple and apricot would not both appear on the fruit list since they both start with the 
letter “a”).  This was to ensure that in the retrieval inducement phase the participant 
could be presented with the category title and a first letter of an item from the list and 
have that letter refer to a unique item in the list.  For each participant the ten fruit and 
animal items in each list were randomly assigned to one of the possible presentation 
frequency (14-14-11-11-8-8-5-5-2-2). 
Pictures for each category item from the two lists were obtained from 
Microsoft word clip art and from Google pictures such that each category item had a 
corresponding cartoon-type picture that was presented in conjunction with the item 
name. 
The judgment question was modified from Sloman et al.’s (2004) packed 




judged.  The generation question was revised from the judgment question to ask for 
generation rather than a judgment and was similar to the generation question from 
Experiment 1. 
Design and Procedure 
 The study was a two (inducement type: part-set cuing versus retrieval 
inducement) by three (cue typicality: atypical, typical, or no-cue) between subjects 
design with both inducement and cue typicality being manipulated between 
participants.  The entire experiment took approximately half an hour to complete. 
 Participants all received the same initial training with the two category lists.  
Participants were told that Steve the sloppy stamp collector loves to collect stamps, 
but Steve is very particular about the stamps that he collects; he only collects stamps 
that are exactly the same size, weight, texture, and are sold as a single stamp.  
However, whenever Steve collects a new stamp he simply throws it into a brown 
paper bag rather than organizing his stamp collection.  The participants were told that 
Steve is starting a new collection of stamps and they are going to observe the stamps 
that he collects, and throws into his stamp bag, by observing each stamp picture and 
label that appear on the screen.  Each presentation of a picture and label represents a 
new stamp that Steve has acquired, and that they will be asked questions of the 
stamps Steve collects at a later time. 
Within each category list the items were randomly assigned to one of the 
possible frequency presentations (14-14-11-11-8-8-5-5-2-2).  The animal and fruit 
category lists were then combined and randomized to create one master learning list.  




one item label and picture on screen for 4 seconds followed by .33 seconds where the 
screen is cleared and the next item label and picture is presented. 
The part-set cuing and retrieval inducement conditions received the same 
initial training, the same judgment and generation tasks, but differed on type of 
inducement following training.  After the learning phase the part-set cuing condition 
went immediately to the category judgment and generation phases while the retrieval 
inducement condition proceeded to the retrieval inducement phase which was then 
followed by the judgment and generation phases. 
The category judgment phase followed the initial training in the part-set cuing 
condition participants.  Each participant had one of the two categories (fruit or 
animals) that was randomly selected to be the target category such that the judgment 
category cues were taken from that category and the judgment question was about 
that category.  For the category judgment phase participants were asked to provide a 
judgment to the following question: 
If Steve the sloppy stamp collector were to shake the sack of stamps up, and 
while blindfolded randomly select a stamp from the bag with ALL the stamps 
that you saw in it, and only the stamps that you saw, what is the probability 
that he would select a stamp with a [FRUIT or ANIMAL] on it? 
 
For the no-cue condition the participants were asked the above category judgment 
question verbatim.  For the atypical cue condition the probability question contained 
four cues in the above judgment question that were the category items that had the 
lowest presentation frequency (2-2-5-5) in the initial learning phase.  The conclusion 
of the category judgment question in the atypical cue condition would ask “what is 




such as a ___, ___, ___ or ____ stamp?”  The blanks would be filled in with the 
appropriate low frequency category items for that participant.  Likewise the typical 
cue condition judgment question was exactly the same format as the atypical cue 
condition except that the four cues that were used in the question were the category 
items that had the highest presentation frequency (11-11-15-15) in the initial learning 
phase.  Since the items were randomly assigned to presentation frequency for each 
subject, these atypical and typical judgment cues differed by participant. 
Immediately following the judgment phase participants in the part-set cuing 
condition proceeded to the generation phase where they were asked to unpack the 
focal hypothesis from the previous category judgment.  This task was essentially a 
free recall of items learned in the initial learning phase from the category they just 
judged: 
Please try to recall all of the different types of [fruit or animal] stamps that 
you saw Steve put in his sack (i.e., what type of [fruit or animal] was on the 
stamp).   
  
Please type in a [fruit or animal] that you saw on a stamp that Steve put in his 
sack in the below box and when you are finished typing the [fruit or animal], 
press "Enter" AFTER EACH [FRUIT or ANIMAL] that you type in the box.  
When you can not recall any more [fruit or animal] stamps, or if you think you 
have recalled all the [fruit or animal] stamps, type "done" and then press 
"Enter" to continue. 
 
There was no maximum number of items that the participants could generate and the 
items.   
 After the generation phase the participants immediately proceeded to a 
category item judgment phase where they were asked to judge the likelihood that the 
individual items they generated in the preceding category generation phase would be 




Steve the sloppy stamp collector decided to sort through his special stamp 
sack and separate the fruit and animal stamps into 2 different brown sacks.  If 
Steve shook up the sack with the [FRUIT or ANIMAL] stamps in it, and then 
while blindfolded he randomly picked a stamp from that fruit sack, what is the 
probability that Steve would pick a _____ stamp? 
 
The above blank was filled in with an item from the category generation task that the 
participant had generated.  Participants judged the probability of each item they 
generated in the generation phase.  The items generated in the generation phase were 
randomized and then presented sequentially in the above judgment with one judgment 
immediately following another until all the generation items had been judged. 
 The category item judgment phase was followed by a final residual judgment 
phase where participants were asked to judge the likelihood that they forgot any 
category items in the generation phase, and what the probability would be of 
randomly selecting the non-recalled items from the category: 
Steve the sloppy stamp collector decided to sort through his special stamp 
sack and separate the fruit and animal stamps into 2 different brown sacks.  If 
Steve shook up the sack with the [FRUIT or ANIMAL] stamps in it, and then 
while blindfolded he randomly picked a stamp from the [FRUIT or ANIMAL] 
sack, what is the probability that Steve would pick a [fruit or animal] stamp 
other than the [fruit or animal] stamps that you recalled that are listed below? 
 
All of the items that the participant had recalled in the generation phase were listed 
below the residual judgment question.   
After completing all of these phases the participants were debriefed.  In 
summary, the part-set cuing condition had five phases: a learning, category judgment, 
generation phase, item generation judgment phase, and residual judgment phase. 
In contrast to the part-set cuing condition, after the initial learning phase in the 
retrieval inducement condition an inducement phase was interposed between the 




from Experiment 2.  In summary, the retrieval inducement condition had six phases: a 
learning, retrieval inducement, category judgment, generation, item generation 
judgment, and residual judgment phase. 
In the inducement phase the category name of the category that was randomly 
selected to be judged (fruit or animal) was presented along with the first letter of the 
cue that was to be retrieved and participants are instructed to fill in the blank with the 
appropriate word from the stamp items previously learned.  For example, in the 
typical condition a participant might see “Fruit – P________” and would be asked to 
fill in the blank with a fruit stamp item that they learned previously that started with 
the letter ‘P’.  There were four cues that were used and each cue word stem was 
presented three times for a total of twelve retrieval inducement trials.  In the atypical 
condition the four cues used were the cues that were randomly assigned to the 
presentation frequencies of two and four, which were the two lowest presentation 
frequencies.  In the typical condition the four cues used were the cues that were 
randomly assigned to the presentation frequencies of eleven and fourteen, which were 
the two highest frequency presentations.  The inducement cues were randomly 
presented for this retrieval inducement phase. 
The retrieval inducement phase in the retrieval inducement condition was then 
followed by the category judgment phase whereby the participants were asked a 
packed category probability question for both the typical and atypical cue conditions 





Immediately following the category judgment phase participants proceeded to 
a generation phase and were asked to unpack the focal hypothesis from the preceding 
judgment phase.  This was followed by a category item judgment phase where the 
items the participants generated were judged.  Finally there was a residual judgment 
phase followed by a debriefing.  The generation, category item judgment and residual 
judgment questions and procedures were the same as those used in the part-set cuing 
condition.  
Results and Discussion 
Generation Data 
 There was no main effect of cue frequency or inducement type on the number 
of items generated (see Figure 9): The number of category items generated was 
equivalent in all typicality and inducement conditions (see Table 5).  Since generation 
of items from a small set appears to be unaffected by cue frequency and inducement 
type, this may be consistent with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 and argues against a 
part-set cuing or inhibition account. 
Support Values 
 Support values were based on the presentation frequency of each item for each 
participant and were isomorphically translated into an estimate of support ranging 
from 2 – 15.  Individual values of summation of support and a mean support of items 
generated for each participant were then calculated and averaged across conditions. 
 There was no main effect of cue frequency or inducement type on summation 




that had equivalent summation of support (see Table 5).  There was also no 
























   
   
   
   
   
   




Figure 9. Experiment 3 Mean Number of Items Generated by Cue Typicality and Inducement with 
Standard Error Bars 
 
 
 Part-Set Cuing 
 Packed Atypical Typical 
Judgment Mean (Std. Deviation) 0.52  (0.02) 0.51  (0.02) 0.55  (0.02) 
Number of Items Generated 
(SD) 
6.96  (1.43) 7.32  (1.66) 7.93  (1.72) 
Summation of Support of Items 
(SD) 
56.96  (14.54) 61.18  (13.57) 63.50  (20.65) 
Mean Support of Items (SD) 8.08  (1.30) 8.27  (1.29) 8.07  (1.26) 
 Retrieval Inducement 
 Packed Atypical Typical 
Judgment Mean (Std. Deviation) 0.49  (0.02) 0.52  (0.02) 0.54  (0.02) 
Number of Items Generated 
(SD) 
7.54  (1.66) 7.04  (1.67) 7.50  (1.73) 
Summation of Support of Items 
(SD) 
57.58  (17.98) 56.44  (20.43) 62.69 (12.32) 
Mean Support of Items (SD) 7.50  (1.81) 7.23  (1.76)  8.51  (1.21) 



























   
   
   
   
   
   
   




Figure 10. Experiment 3 Summation of Support of Items Generated by Cue Typicality and 
Inducement with Standard Error Bars 
 
However, there was an interaction effect of cue frequency and inducement 
type on the mean support of items generated F(2, 156) = 3.74, p < 0.05 (see Figure 
11).  There was a main effect of cue frequency on mean support of items generated 
for the retrieval inducement F(2, 74) = 4.51, p < 0.05, but not for the part set cuing 
inducement.  Further analyses indicate that the high frequency-cue condition had a 
significantly greater mean support of items generated than the low frequency-cue 
condition in the retrieval inducement conditions, but neither of the frequency 
conditions differed significantly from the packed conditions mean support of items 
generated (see Table 5).  Taken together these results indicate that when a small set is 
being judged the support of items generated is largely unaffected by part-set cuing 
inducement and cue frequency, while retrieval inducement appears to affect the mean 




















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   





Figure 11. Experiment 3 Average Support of Items Generated by Cue Typicality and Inducement with 
Standard Error Bars 
Judgments 
 There was no main effect of cue frequency or inducement type on judgment, 
nor was there an interaction between cue frequency and inducement type (see Figure 
12): The subjective judgments were equivalent in all frequency and inducement 
conditions (see Table 5).  This would indicate that judgments of small sets are not 
affected by unpacked or retrieved cue frequency and may operate by different 
processes than judgments of large sets. 
 Consistent with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 there were no significant 
correlations between judgment and the number of items, summation, or average 
support of items generated for any of the frequency conditions collapsed across 
inducement type (see Table 6).  There was also a significant positive correlation 




generated for all frequency conditions (see Table 6).  The correlations with the 
average support of items generated differ slightly among the frequency conditions.  
The low frequency-cue and packed conditions do not have a significant correlation 
between the number of items and the average support of items generated, but there is 
a significant positive correlation between the summation and the average support of 
items generated (see Table 6).  The high frequency-cued condition has a near reversal 
of the other conditions correlation results: There is a significant negative correlation 
between the number of items and the average support of items generated and no 
significant correlation between the summation and the average support of items 
























Figure 12. Experiment 3 Mean Probability Judgments by Cue Typicality and Inducement with 








No Category Cue Condition 






Judgment 1 -.12 .03 .10 
Number of Items  -.12 1 .68** .13 
Summation of 
Support 
.03 .68** 1 .65** 
Average Support  .10 .13 .65** 1 
  
Atypical Category Cue Condition 
Judgment 1 -.01 .02 .20 
Number of Items  -.01 1 .60** -.05 
Summation of 
Support 
.02 .60** 1 .51** 
Average Support  .20 -.05 .51** 1 
  
Typical Category Cue Condition 
Judgment 1 .125 -.05 -.13 
Number of Items  .125 1 .65** -.38** 
Summation of 
Support 
-.05 .65** 1 .14 
Average Support  -.13 -.38** .14 1 
Table 6. Experiment 3 Means (and Standard Deviations) 
 
The correlation data indicate that in all frequency conditions the more items 
that are generated the greater the summation of support, but when high frequency 
cues are provided, the more instances that are generated the less the average support 
of the generated items.  This makes sense inasmuch as the items left to unpack after 




continue to unpack after the high frequency cues are provided they are by definition 
unpacking low frequency items that drive their summation of support up and their 
average support down.  Since the low frequency cues are provided, the judges start 
out with the highest average support possible (all of the highest support items and 
none of the low support items).  Unpacking will then increase the summation of 
support, but it can only serve to decrease the average support for the judges.5
  Conversely, when the low frequency cues are provided that leaves the high 
frequency cues to be unpacked, and if judges continue to unpack this would lead to an 
increase in the summation of support as well as an increase in the average support as 
higher frequency items with high support are included.  Since the low frequency cues 
are provided, the judges start out with the lowest average support possible (all of the 
lowest support items and none of the high support items).  Unpacking can only 
increase both the summation and the average support since only higher support items 
will be generated. 
In order to test whether the effect of cue frequency on judgment was due to 
the generation of hypotheses, a series of covariate analyses were conducted to test 
whether the effect of cue frequency was significant after controlling for variance due 
to the number of items generated, the summation of the support values of the 
generated items, and the mean support of the generated items.  None of these were 
significant as covariates and all effects of cue frequency and inducement remained 
not significant: The number, summation, and mean support of items generated are not 
predictive of judgments.  Taken together it appears that none of the generation data 
are predictive of judgments. 
                                                 









Chapter 5:  General Discussion 
 
 
The purpose of this paper was to assess three theories that account for the 
effect of typicality on unpacking: the central tendency of support theory, the narrow 
interpretation theory, and a misinterpretation theory.  The paper also contrasted the 
additive and averaging support models for subjective probability judgments. 
The generation data from all three Experiments indicate that there are no part-
set cuing effects: Experiments 1 and 3 show that the cued conditions do not generate 
significantly less items than the non-cued conditions, while Experiment 2 shows that 
the atypical-cue condition generated more items than the typical-cue condition.  Part-
set cuing effects, which were hypothesized as a potential mechanism for the narrow 
interpretation theory, would not predict these generation results: If part-set cuing 
effects were present it would be expected that the non-cued conditions would 
generate more items than the cued conditions. 
Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the judgment results found by Sloman et al. 
(2004): The typicality of category item cues affected subsequent subjective 
judgments.  Participants who were cued with atypical category instances provided 
significantly lower mean category judgments than those participants who received no 
cues or typical category cues.  The no-cue and typically cued conditions provided 
mean judgments that were not significantly different from each other.  In contrast, 
Experiment 3 did not show any effects of cue typicality on judgments of small sets 




Though the judgments differed significantly by cue typicality, the generation 
data from Experiment 1 showed no effect of cue typicality.  Additionally, none of the 
generation data were found to be significant predictors or mediators of judgment, and 
the main effect of cue typicality on judgment remained significant when controlling 
for number, summation, or mean support of items generated.  Thus, the generation 
data are not able to predict the judgment data and do not allow for discrimination 
between an additive and averaging model of judgment since neither model would 
predict the judgment results.  The contrasting effect of typicality on judgments and 
lack of typicality effects on the generation data indicate that a misinterpretation of the 
question may be causing the judgment data. 
Experiment 2 used a modified retrieval induced forgetting paradigm to reduce 
the likelihood of bias and misinterpretation by enabling all participants to be asked 
the same packed category judgment question.  Since the judgment results from 
Experiment 2 also corroborate the judgment results of Sloman et al. (2004) and 
Experiment 1, this indicates that neither a misinterpretation of the question nor an 
anchoring and adjustment process underlies the differences in judgments. 
Furthermore, in the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm in Experiment 2, 
both the judgment and generation data show an effect of cue typicality.  The atypical-
cue condition had a significantly higher number of items generated and subsequently 
a higher summation of support, but a lower average support of items than the typical-
cue condition.  This diverging result offers differential predictions for the additive 
and averaging models with the averaging model accurately predicting the judgment 




Moreover, the number of items generated is a significant negative predictor of 
judgments, and when controlled for the effects of cue typicality become non-
significant.  This indicates that the number of items generated is mediating judgments 
such that judgments decrease as more items are generated.  This result is also 
inconsistent with an additive model, which predicts a positive relationship between 
number-of-items generated and judgment. In contrast, the result is not inconsistent 
with an averaging model. 
However, the judgment results from Experiment 3 indicate that frequency 
may not be equivalent to typicality.  Frequency of presentation, or experience with a 
set of items, appears to be a different construct than typicality inasmuch as we have 
diverging effects on judgment for frequency and typicality.  It may be that typicality 
is more of a prototype comparison than a frequency learning construct, and is 
something that future research may want to explore in order to clearly assess what the 
construct of typicality represents. 
Experiment 3 also shows that frequency of presentation does not affect 
judgments and indicates that the typicality effect may be specific to large judgment 
sets.  There were no significant effects of cue frequency or inducement type on 
category judgments, number of items generated, or the summation of support of the 
items that were generated, nor were any of these measures significant predictors of 
judgment.   
A potential reason that there are no frequency effects on judgment may be due 
in part to these judgment results being biased towards the null hypothesis since the 




often chosen when people do not know the objective probability (Fischhoff & Bruine 
De Bruin, 1999).  Additionally, in frequency learning it may be more difficult to learn 
a ratio of 70-30 than a ratio of 50-50, and this difficulty in learning may provide more 
variability between participants that could increase differences in judgments.  Future 
studies may want to manipulate the objective category frequencies to assess if such a 
bias is a concern in interpreting the data. 
Interestingly, the results of Experiments 1 and 2, both of which revealed main 
effects of typicality on judgment, might be due to different mechanisms.  For 
example, the most plausible account of the results of Experiment 1 is the 
misinterpretation hypothesis.  That is, because participants were given slightly 
different versions of the judgment question, this may have enticed them to interpret 
the judgment question differently (even though they were normatively equivalent).  
As Stanovitch and West (2000) point out, participants sometimes interpret judgment 
questions differently from what is intended by the experimenter: 
It is the argument that although the experimenter may well be applying the 
correct  
normative model to the problem as set, the subject might be construing the 
problem  
differently and be providing the normatively appropriate answer to a different 
problem –  
in short, that subjects have a different interpretation of the task. 
 
Our replication of Sloman et al (2004) in Experiment 1 suggests that this might just 
be the case here where it appears reasonable to assume that participants are 
misinterpreting the question due to the different exemplars provided. 
However, the results of Experiment 2 are open to a more interesting 




differential effects on retrieval depending on cue typicality.  Cue typicality 
inducement may either be preventing participants from, or facilitating generation of 
alternative hypotheses for including in the judgment process.  Participants induced 
with typical exemplars fail to retrieve (atypical) items that participants induced with 
atypical exemplars retrieve.  Conversely, participants induced with atypical 
exemplars show a benefit in retrieval inasmuch as they generate more items than the 
typical-cue condition.   
Moreover, the generation data in conjunction with the judgment data from 
Experiment 2 are consistent with an averaging model of support theory, rather than an 
additive model.  The differential effects of cue typicality on retrieval provided 
opposing predictions for the judgment data based on the additive and averaging 
models, with the averaging model correctly predicting the judgment results. 
Finally, the results of experiment 3 suggest that the effect of typicality on 
judgment may be limited to large sets of items or natural categories.  In fact, this 
finding is in keeping with recent research showing that part-set cueing is not effective 
when implemented within small sets (Oswald, 1999). 
Alternately, it may be the case that the generation data do not correspond to 
the items considered when making the preceding judgments.  Future studies should 
manipulate the timing of the generation task, such that participants generate items 
either prior to, or after, making their judgment. In this way, one can more closely 
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